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TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES? THE
INADEQUACY OF CONSEQUENTIALIST
ARGUMENTS AGAINST MULTICULTURAL
RELATIVISM
BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT
ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW. Daniel Farber' &
Suzanna Sherry. 2 New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
1997. Pp. 208. $25.00.
Roderick M. Hills, Jr. 3
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have written a fairminded and heartfelt polemic against what they call "radical
multiculturalism" in the legal academy. According to the
authors, "radical multiculturalism" is the belief that all
"objective" standards of factual accuracy, academic or professional merit, or legal coherence are merely "social constructions," meaning that they are really nothing but "exercises of
power by one group over another." (p. 118) Rather than strive
to conform to such standards, radical multiculturalism maintains
that scholars should expose them for what they are-the efforts
of white, heterosexual males to subordinate gay and lesbian persons, African-Americans and other racial minorities, or women.
Beyond All Reason attacks this radical multiculturalist
strain in legal academia, not because the radical's critique is untrue but because it has bad consequences. According to Beyond
All Reason, "the radicals' attachment to social constructionism
and related doctrines" undermines attainment of "the radicals'
own progressive goals." (p. 7) The book maintains that radical
multiculturalism has dangerous (albeit unintended) anti-Semitic
and anti-Asian implications, because it casts doubt on the basis
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of Jews' and Asian-Americans' intellectual achievements. The
book also argues that radical multiculturalism leads its practitioners to engage in a paranoid style of argument, in which
threats of excommunication are used to stifle free and open debate and one's "authenticity" as a representative of one's sexual
or racial group counts for more than factual accuracy or logical
consistency.
As an effort to describe and deplore a certain strain in the
legal academy, Beyond All Reason has many virtues. It is scrupulously honest in its quotation of the radical multiculturalists
that it attacks, its tone is never shrill, and the style is refreshingly
unpretentious. Moreover, the book's evidence supports its conclusions: Farber and Sherry provide a depressingly long catalogue of egregiously silly posturing by radical multiculturalists, a
list of quotes worthy of a character out of a Tom Wolfe novel.
(My personal favorite is Richard Delgado's remark that "if you
are black or Mexican, you should flee Enlightenment-based democracies like mad, assuming you have any choice," because
"racism and enlightenment are the same thing." (p. 29))
Beyond All Reason, however, is ultimately unsatisfying, because it provides no serious evaluation of the truth of radical
multiculturalism's foundational claims. For authors who claim
to value truth, Farber and Sherry seem curiously indifferent to
it: they exhibit a world-weary anti-intellectualism that is strikingly similar to the attitudes of the radical multiculturalists that
they criticize. They concede that radical multiculturalism's
claims about objectivity, truth, and merit are "astoundingly
powerful," and they seem to believe that any effort to disprove
the truth of such claims would be futile. Instead, they stake
their entire attack on radical multiculturalism on the argument
that its tenets are dangerous-that they will have bad consequences like anti-Semitism, shrill and unintelligible scholarship,
and sloppiness about factual accuracy. As I shall suggest below
in Part II of this review, this argument from consequences is not
a successful strategy. Farber and Sherry seem far too defensive,
too lacking in confidence about their notions of truth and value,
to mount a convincing defense of Enlightenment and academic
dialogue, both of which, after all, are predicated on the idea that
the impartial pursuit of truth and justice is a sensible and
worthwhile undertaking. In a larger sense, Farber and Sherry
unintentionally expose a weakness of the version of conventional "Enlightenment liberalism" dominant in the legal academy- an inability to respond persuasively to radical challenges
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because of an anemic conception of truth and value. In this
sense, Farber and Sherry share in the Trahison des Clercs that
they so effectively describe.
I

Before one criticizes the book, it is useful to give an overview of its major claims. Beyond All Reason consists of six
chapters. The first two chapters summarize some tenets of radical multiculturalism, while chapters 3, 4, and 5 argue that these
tenets lead to various unacceptable consequences, such as antiSemitism, indifference to factual accuracy, and the breakdown
of civil discourse. Finally, chapter 6 dissects radical multiculturalism to explain why such an ideology might appeal to legal
academics despite these harmful consequences.
The first chapter provides a fair and concise summary of the
ideology that the book later attacks. Farber and Sherry contend
that the intellectual foundation of radical multiculturalism is the
premise that "reality is socially constructed by the powerful in
order to perpetuate their own hegemony." (p. 23) Under this
view, statements about social institutions are not "objective."
Rather, they are tools by which the persons currently dominant
in society- the "white male establishment"- maintain their
dominance. Statements about "justice", "merit", and "truth" in
reality serve the interests of social elites. Even the concepts of
knowledge and empirical proof are "constructed" by powerful
elites in order to impose their view of the world on less powerful
persons. (p. 27) Judgments about empirical proof or academic
merit do not reflect any objective reality about the world.
Rather, they reflect the "mindset" of the dominant social
groups-their "bundles of presuppositions, received wisdoms,
and shared understandings." (p. 29) (citation omitted)
Radical multiculturalists, in spite of their skeptical attitude
toward values like objectivity and scientific inquiry traditionally
associated with the European Enlightenment, remain inexplicably loyal to the Enlightenment ideal of egalitarianism. They
seek to promote a more egalitarian society and prevent white
male heterosexual elites from dominating less powerful groups.
Toward this end, radical multiculturalists urge scholars to reject
putatively objective standards for assessing law, academic merit,
or factual accuracy and instead provide narratives or stories that
inspire subordinated communities to resist white male hegemony. (pp. 38-41) Scholarship, according to the radical multicul-
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turalists, is really a species of rhetoric, to be evaluated by its effectiveness in creating an egalitarian society. Radical multiculturalists also maintain that one's membership in ethnic, sexual
or gender groups crucially affects one's ability to provide or appreciate such rhetoric: white male scholars may be incapable of
understanding or evaluating the narratives of women or people
of color, while membership in an oppressed social group may
constitute "virtually a presumption of expertise" in understanding such narratives. (pp. 30-31) (citation omited)
What practical consequences does such a theory have for
the study of the law? Farber and Sherry argue in chapter 2 that
radical multiculturalist legal theory has four notable features,
two of which are highly general and two of which concern more
specific legal doctrines. First, radical multiculturalist theory
charges that traditional legal reasoning is really rooted in the
protection of white and male self-interest: the mindset of mostly
white and male judges leads them to use the law to protect the
interests of other white male persons. (pp. 36-38) Second, radical multiculturalists prefer emotionally stirring narratives to
blander, more dispassionate accounts of how the law operates.
(pp. 38-40) Third, radical multiculturalists recommend that traditional First Amendment doctrine be modified to permit suppression of speech that may be thought to contribute to the
stigmatization of oppressed social groups. For example pornography or racial hate speech should be more easily restricted or
banned. (pp. 40-45) Fourth and finally, because the white,
male, heterosexual mindsets are often unconscious, courts
should hold that laws can deprive persons of equal protection
even when such laws are not enacted with any intentional hostility toward some ethnic group, women, or homosexuals.
(pp. 45-47)
Farber and Sherry assert without explanation that this ideology of radical multiculturalism is "astoundingly powerful,"
(p. 23) but, as noted above, they never attempt to evaluate its
intellectual merits. Instead, they makes three different arguments in the third, fourth, and fifth chapters respectively that
radical multiculturalism undermines radical multiculturalists'
own commitment to egalitarianism.
The first (and, as I suggest below, the weakest) of these arguments is Farber's and Sherry's claim, set forth in chapter 3,
that radical multiculturalism's attack on the ideal of objective
merit is anti-Semitic and anti-Asian. The foundation for this argument is the fact that Jews and Asian-Americans are over-
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represented in academic, intellectual, professional, and economic life relative to their share of the United States population. According to Farber and Sherry, given the radical multiculturalists' premise that academic standards are the result of
an illegitimate exercise of power, "[t]he radical multiculturalists
cannot account for this success without attributing it to the exercise of power by Jews and Asian Americans." (p. 58) In short,
if objective standards of merit are the result of a conspiracy,
then they are necessarily the result of a Jewish-Asian conspiracy, for Jews and Asians are the beneficiaries of such standards-and, of course, the Jewish conspiracy is the leitmotif of
anti-Semitism.
In chapter 4, Farber and Sherry provide a second attack on
radical multiculturalism, by arguing against radical multiculturalists' view that scholarship should be concerned with personal stories rather than objective truth. According to Farber
and Sherry, this concern with narratives "discourages fruitful
debate in several ways while at the same time making it easier
for these [radical multicultural] scholars comfortably to reaffirm
their preconceptions." (p. 73) The authors note that personalized stories about individuals' experience with racism or sexism
may not accurately reflect what typically occurs in the real world
as revealed by more systematic statistical studies. The radical
multiculturalists' concern with narratives is especially dangerous, according to Farber and Sherry, because radical multiculturalist scholarship tend to be obsessed with whether such narratives "authentically" reflects the distinctive experience or his or
her ethnic or sexual group. Such an obsession, in tum, results in
a sort of shrill, denunciatory style of argument in which opponents are excommunicated rather than refuted-accused of being traitors to their race or gender (if they are minorities or
women) or of being blinded by the false consciousness of the
prevailing white and male "mindset" (if they are white or male).
(pp. 78-84) Farber and Sherry also note that personalized narratives can often be unintelligible, and they complain that radical
multiculturalism's theory of knowledge-that knowledge is ultimately based on personal emotional reaction-makes it impossible for readers who do not belong to radical multiculturalist's
racial or sexual group to evaluate or even respond to the radical
multiculturalist narratives. (pp. 87-90)
Farber's and Sherry's final attack on radical multiculturalism contained in chapter 5 maintains that radical multiculturalists' denial of the notion of objective truth leads them to take a
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casual attitude toward the distinction between fact and fiction in
their scholarship. This is not to say that radical multiculturalists
deliberately spread lies. Rather, Farber and Sherry maintain
that radical multiculturalists simply do not care enough about
insuring that their scholarship draws a sharp distinction between
false and true statements: radical multiculturalists, according to
Farber and Sherry tend to be sloppy about the truth. As evidence of this tendency, Farber and Sherry cite Patricia Williams'
statement that "Tawana Brawley has been the victim of some
unspeakable crime," regardless of whether she was really raped
by six white men. Farber and Sherry note that, even if there is
deep sense in which Tawana Brawley was the victim of a crime,
it is critically important to evaluate whether her rape accusation
is true-not least in order to vindicate the reputations of six innocent men who have been defamed if, as a grand jury believed,
the accusations were false. (pp. 95-98)
According to Farber and Sherry, Williams' apparent indifferenc~ to this distinction between truth and falsity is not simply
a singular case of rhetorical excess: it is, rather, symptomatic of
radical multiculturalism's principle that objective truth is a
white, male, and heterosexual social construction. To support
this claim, Farber and Sherry cite four historical inaccuracies
contained in radical multiculturalist scholarship, as well as the
more general tendency of radical multiculturalist authors to discount or ignore the value of statistical evidence that contradicts
their positions on, for instance, law school hiring practices or the
effects of single-parent families on children's well-being. (pp.
100-102) Farber and Sherry conclude the chapter by arguing
that truth-seeking is useful to a democracy. For instance, they
argue that, if one abandons the distinction between truth and
falsehood, then one will lose an objective standard by which to
assess the lies told by tyrants to consolidate their power.
(p. 103) To illustrate the point, the authors note that a college
newspaper editor has justified her decision to publish the ads of
"Holocaust deniers" by using "radical multiculturalist language," arguing that "the deniers are simply revisionists who are
'reinterpreting history."' (p. 109) (citation omitted) Farber and
Sherry also insist that "the scientific method" and a "willingness
to search for truth" promotes habits of mind useful for democratic citizenship "such as open-mindedness, humility, tolerance,
and an awareness of obligations beyond self-interest." (p. 107)
The sixth chapter of Beyond All Reason is devoted to diagnosing radical multiculturalism- that is, trying to figure out why
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radical multiculturalism persists in attracting legal scholars despite its perverse consequences. The authors conclude that the
ideology's foundational rejection of objective standards makes it
particularly intellectually insular and immune from rational
challenge, (pp. 120-127) while its tenets provide psychological
comfort to academics who wish massively to expand affirmative
action in law school admissions and hiring, because those tenets
deny that such expansion would be accompanied by any real
costs. (pp. 127-133) The authors conclude their diagnosis with
the observation that radical multiculturalism constitutes a particularly difficult form of mindset to uproot, because it resembles a species of paranoia-a self-sealing obsession that a pervasive conspiracy controls all law and all modes of reasoning.
(pp. 133-137)
II

A central problem with Beyond All Reason is that it focuses
entirely on the rhetorical consequences of radical multiculturalism rather than on its intellectual merits. With a practical lawyers' disdain for intellectual abstractions, Farber and Sherry abstain from any serious analysis of radical multiculturalism's
claims about the social construction of reality beyond conceding
inexplicably, that such claims are "astoundingly powerful."
(p. 23) According to the authors, any such investigation into
"the truth of the radical multiculturalist ideas" would be futile,
because "[i]t is the very concept of 'truth' that is in dispute" -a
dispute that, the authors seem to believe, is unresolvable.
(p. 50) Maybe radical multiculturalism has flaws in its reasoning, Farber and Sherry concede, but who cares? "[H]aving philosophical problems does not necessarily distinguish radical multiculturalism from any other jurisprudential approach." (p. 7)
Instead, the authors "prefer to ask whether [radical multiculturalism] ... is wise politics" -whether it is a good way to "seek
the best life for a community" (p. 50)-apparently on the odd
assumption that it is easier to produce consensus on disputes
about politics than epistemology.
The result of such an emphasis on practical consequences
rather than truth is that Beyond All Reason is likely to forfeit
the attention of its most likely audience-academics. Academics pride themselves on being tough-minded thinkers who will
accept unpleasant consequences if they believe that such consequences follow from the most intellectually sophisticated view of
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the world. Indeed, they might revel in the discouraging consequences of a world-view, because their acceptance of such consequences seems like proof that they are tough, Nietzchean
thinkers, free from the laypersons' need to cling to comfortable
superstitions. Thus, when Farber and Sherry argue for the rejection of Radical Multiculturalism on the ground that radical multiculturalism produces unpleasant consequences-illiberal,
shrill, tendentious scholarship-they do not really address multiculturalism's central conceit that it unsparingly "unmasks" the
reality behind notions like objectivity and impartiality. Given
that Farber and Sherry abstain from challenging the tenets of
radical multiculturalism on their merits, is it really a refutation
of them to say that they make us uncomfortable or undermine
our conventional understanding of "democratic constitutionalism" or that they lead to shrill, tendentious, unempirical scholarship? Maybe these consequences are the price we have to pay to
remain tough-minded Nietzchean intellectuals who unflinchingly accept the world as it is, free from illusory concepts of objectivity and impartiality.
Each of the three arguments against radical multiculturalism is seriously weakened by this refusal to engage the intellectual foundation of radical multiculturalism. Take, for instance,
the argument in chapter 3 that radical multiculturalism is antiSemitic. As a preliminary matter, one might note that Farber's
and Sherry's argument is, itself, tendentious at best. They reason that, if (1) conventional academic standards are the result of
a conspiracy to exclude members of racial minorities and (2)
Jews and Asian-Americans disproportionately succeed under
conventional academic standards, then it follows that (3) Jews
and Asian-Americans must somehow be a party to the racist
conspiracy. But, even assuming that the first premise is a correct statement of radical multiculturalist arguments (which
seems doubtfult, the conclusion does not follow from the
premises. The disproportionate success of Jews and Asians
might simply be a fortuitous rather than intended result of the
whites' efforts to exclude African-Americans. It might be that
white Anglo-Saxon males lack the political or social power to
reserve academic jobs for themselves with an express color bar.
4. The central claim of radical multiculturalists is not that white academics exclude minority candidates for academic positions because of deliberate racism but rather
because they are led by their unconscious "white mindset" to overlook the importance
of minority scholars' achievements. Farber's and Sherry's argument concerning antiSemitism does nothing to address this more subtle claim.
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Instead, whites choose an ostensibly race-neutral standardgood grades, high test scores, etc.- that they predict will disproportionately benefit themselves. Jews and Asians might fortuitously happen to achieve disproportionate success under the
standard chosen by the whites (perhaps because Jewish and
Asian tradition, religion or culture encourages Jewish and Asian
children to cultivate an interest in being highly literate and
skilled at the interpretation of texts). It hardly follows that the
disproportionate success of Jewish candidates is somehow the
result of a Jewish or Asian conspiracy or even the intended result of a white conspiracy.
Farber's and Sherry's response to this possibility for fortuitous Jewish or Asian-American success is obscure. They seem
to argue that fortuitous Jewish or Asian-American success is
ruled out by the radical multiculturalists' premise that "white
gentiles impose standards of merit to solidify their own power."
(p. 60) Apparently, Farber and Sherry argue that, because
whites are (by hypothesis) capable of controlling access to academic positions, Jews and Asian-Americans could not surpass
whites unless whites deliberately decided to bestow such a benefit upon them. But this assertion does not follow from any radical multicultural premise: it might be that whites simply cannot
use a more precise standard without betraying their purpose of
racial exclusion. Thus, they have to use a cruder proxy for
whiteness, one that unfortunately (in the views of white gentiles)
admits a lot of Jews. It is hard to see why such a conspiracy theory implicates Jews in white racism or even suggests that Jews or
Asian-Americans are the stooges of racist whites. 5
In short, the argument that radical multiculturalism has
anti-Semitic implications seems, at best, to be the highly speculative product of Farber's and Sherry's imagination rather than a
genuine risk of adhering to multicultural ideas. But, quite apart
from its implausibility, it is odd that Farber and Sherry prefer to
plunge into the morass of identity politics and draw byzantine
inferences of anti-Semitism from implausible multiculturalist
5. To be fair, Farber and Sherry provide some evidence that white gentiles have
used criteria to reduce the success of Jewish college applicants, such as requirements of
geographic diversity or pedigree or "character." They contend that the deployment of
such standards indicates that Jews could not succeed without the active acquiescence of
white gentiles. But the natural response is that such ostensibly race- or religion-neutral
criteria obviously did not prevent substantial Jewish success in college admissions, either
because their invidious purpose was detected and the standards were repealed or because Jewish applicants overcame the disability of such criteria. These facts do not show
that white gentiles have infinite capacity to manipulate the system for their own benefit.
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conspiracy theories rather than simply defend the concept of
objective merit in a straightforward way. As I shall argue below
in Part III, the obvious objection to the radical multiculturalists'
theory of merit is that it rests on an incoherent theory of knowledge and meaning. Yet Farber and Sherry somehow feel that
such objections are foreclosed to them by the "astoundingly
powerful" nature of radical multicultural arguments. It is a
mark of how much they are willing to concede to the relativism
of their opponents that they instead insist on making their case
against radical multiculturalism through their own tortured inferences from the logic of identity politics.
The same criticism applies to Farber's and Sherry's arguments in chapters 4 and 5 that radical multiculturalism undermines commitment to public discourse and truth. By contrast
with the "anti-Semitism" argument in chapter 3, these arguments in chapters 4 and 5 are at least supported by quotes from
multiculturalist scholarship, which indicate that radical multiculturalists are prone to shrill denunciations of opponents, unintelligible narratives, witch hunts into writers' lack of racial
"authenticity," and ideologically convenient self-delusion about
the facts. Moreover, Farber and Sherry plausibly suggest that
these tendencies are not aberrations but rather the natural consequences of radical multiculturalism's foundational premisesits emphasis that all knowledge is really nothing more than the
"mindset" of some social or racial group. The difficulty with
Farber's and Sherry's arguments, however, is that, because Beyond All Reason refuses to challenge the intellectual truth of
those foundational premises, the book cannot provide any interesting reasons to believe that shrillness, factual inaccuracy, etc.,
are adequate grounds for rejecting multicultural scholarship.
Take, for example, Farber's and Sherry's claim in chapter 4
that radical multiculturalists distort debate with their "stress on
legal storytelling." (p. 73) Farber and Sherry argue that reliance on personal narratives tends to impede constructive debate
about the truth or value of social policy, because there is no way
to verify or evaluate the personal narratives on which radical
multicultural scholarship tends to rely. But the whole point of
radical multiculturalism is to transform the style and method of
academic debate to reflect the alleged reality that scholarly positions are really a function of the authors' race, gender, or sexuality. Therefore, it is hardly a devastating blow to their foundational premises to say that they would undermine traditional
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academic dialogue. That's what radical multiculturalists want to
do.
Moreover, by refusing to make the intellectual case against
radical multiculturalist premises about truth, meaning, and
merit, Farber and Sherry substantially undermine any reason to
be concerned about the distortion of academic debate caused by
narratives. After all, if multicultural theories of truth and
meaning are correct, then it would follow that conventional academic dialogue achieves only a spurious and illusory progress
toward any meaningful truth. Why, then, be worried that the
tendencies of radical multiculturalism undermine such a useless
social practice as academic dialogue? Worrying about the loss of
honest and open debate without defending the notion of objective truth is like worrying about the quality of one's stereo system while being indifferent to music.
The argument in chapter 5 suffers from the same weakness:
without a defense of the concept of truth, the authors cannot
easily show why one should worry about the concept's loss. One
can concede for the sake of argument that Farber and Sherry
might be correct that the idea of objective truth has democratic
virtues; perhaps democracy thrives best when voters and politicians believe that their descriptions of reality are "objective" in
that they transcend race and gender. But this argument puts the
cart before the horse: a belief cannot be useful for democracy
unless people actually believe it, and people will generally not
believe something that is demonstrably implausible. Therefore,
Farber's and Sherry's argument in favor of the notion of objectivity goes nowhere until they show that such a notion is persuasive or coherent-that is, true. One might as well construct a
defense of the concept of Heaven and Hell on the grounds that
these ideas, if believed, would promote democracy by discouraging anti-democratic conduct with the threat of eternal damnation. Maybe they would-but if one can make no persuasive argument that such beliefs are true, then the notion of an afterlife
will provide very little support for democracy, for no one will
believe it. Likewise, if the concept of objective truth really is an
implausible fiction and multicultural relativism is, in fact, a persuasive account of our world and beliefs, then democrats and
egalitarians ought to construct a defense of democracy and
equality that does not depend on such weak reeds such as the
theory of objective truth. In short, Farber and Sherry seem to
engage in what Leo Strauss called the reductio ad Hitlerum- the
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fallacy that an argument is sufficiently refuted if it was made by,
or might benefit, Hitler.
In any case, even as a consequentialist argument, Farber's
and Sherry's case for "truth" is underwhelming for two reasons.
First, there is no real evidence that those who believe in radical
multicultural theories of truth and meaning inevitably or even
usually turn against constitutional democracy. As Farber and
Sherry note in passing, (p. 20-21) radical multiculturalist scholars tend to favor enforcement of conventional constitutional
rights: critical race scholars objected to Critical Legal Studies
precisely because CLS "trashed" conventional constitutional
rights that might protect racial minorities from racist governments. In other words, radical multiculturalists seem perfectly
capable of simultaneously endorsing their strange relativism
rooted in the epigoni of Foucault and Derrida and also supporting conventional democratic and constitutional norms.
Second, Farber and Sherry present only a weak and unconvincing case that the concept of "objective truth" promotes democracy. Part of the trouble is that Farber and Sherry have an
impoverished notion of what it means for statements to be
"objectively true" (meaning, one supposes, non-transitory, reliable, or persuasive). They seem to define "objective truth" to
mean truth as established through some sort of "scientific
method." According to Beyond All Reason, "the scientific
method" is good for democracy because "empirical experimentation designed to approach objective truth" promotes a skeptical attitude towards "institutional authority": "[i]n science as in
democracy, what matters is not who says it but whether it is
right. We are all free to reject another's beliefs, and no dogma
is too sacred to challenge." (p. 107)
Why is such a destruction of institutional authority good for
democracy, which, after all, presumably rests on the authority of
democratic institutions? With unintentional irony, Farber and
Sherry support the democratic credentials of scientific skepticism about authority only by citing authorities-namely, a paragraph of statements by John Dewey and another paragraph of
quotes from a law professor, William Marshall. But, despite the
distinguished citations, this encomium to scientific skepticism as
the best promoter of democracy seems positively perverse. After all, if skepticism is the cardinal virtue of democracy, then one
would think that radical multiculturalism would be even more
democratic than the scientific method, because radical multiculturalism is even more skeptical about claims of truth and merit.
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If one really wants citizens with open minds "free to reject one

another's beliefs" (including presumably beliefs favoring democracy), then the radical skepticism of Foucault and Derrida
might be just the thing we need to perfect democracy.
Of course, Farber and Sherry might respond that they support a happy medium-not the post-modern "nihilistic" skepticism of the radical multiculturalists but rather the moderate
skepticism of the scientific method. They might argue that,
while citizens should be skeptical about the claims of liars and
tyrants, they should not be senselessly skeptical about democracy and the truth. But this argument surely underestimates the
corrosive tendency of the "scientific method." One might argue
in opposition that modern scientific rationality, at least as it is
6
widely understood by social scientists since Max Weber, actually undermines democratic values-indeed, all values-by
maintaining that statements about values are either unjustifiable
or at least less justifiable than statements about facts. To the extent that democracy relies on values-say, the value of human
equality, self-rule, and government through the consent of the
governed-positivist science would seem to undermine rather
than strengthen such values by relegating them to the status of
mere preferences incapable of principled justification. As Steven Smith has argued in a recent book, it is not obvious whether
modern democratic constitutionalism can survive such valueskepticism.7
In sum, it is difficult to say that the relativism purveyed by
radical multiculturalists is obviously worse for democracy and
equality than the scientistic skepticism promoted by Farber and
Sherry. Since both Farber and Sherry and most radical multiculturalists endorse constitutional democracy, it is hard to believe
that the fate of democracy hangs in the balance of their dispute.
This is not to say that Farber and Sherry have not usefully collected evidence that radical multiculturalist scholars frequently
engage in shrill, dogmatic scholarship rife with baffling narra6. For Weber's statement and justification of the fact-value distinction, see Max
Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch,
eds. and trans., The Free Press, 1949).
7. Steven D. Smith, The Constitution and the Pride of Reason (Oxford U. Press,
1998). For a cogent description of how positivist science might threaten democratic Iibe~alism, see G. K. Chesterton, The Poetic Quality in Liberalism, 5 The Independent Review 53 (Feb.-Apr. 1905). As Chesterton notes, "Science, properly speaking, knows
nothing, for instance, of 'the Rights of Man' ideal. Pure science does not admit the existence of the Rights of Man. Pure science, indeed, does not admit the existence of Man
at all. 'Man' is only the gross name we give to a certain patch in the tapestry of evolution, which shades away into other things by nameless gradations." Id. at 61.
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tives, obsessions with psychological "authenticity," and witch
hunts for traitors to the canonical racial, sexual, and gender
groups. Beyond All Reason provides an honest catalogue of
some serious intellectual breakdowns. At an intuitive level,
candid readers can sense that something is radically amiss with
radical multicultural scholarship simply by reading the multicultural material quoted in Beyond All Reason. But, beyond such
common-sense intuitions, Farber and Sherry provide no arguments against radical multiculturalism's follies that would persuade anyone who is remotely inclined to take the multiculturalists seriously.
III

Farber and Sherry might rightly respond that my objections
to their methodology are pointless unless I can come up with a
better way to address the arguments of radical multiculturalist
theories of truth and merit. If Farber and Sherry are correct
that any debate about such matters would be fruitless, then it is
merely churlish to find fault with their approach.
But I believe that Farber and Sherry give up too easily.
Both they and radical multiculturalists ignore a rich literature
from the philosophy of mind and language indicating that the
foundational premises of radical multiculturalism are deeply
confused. Moreover, these arguments against relativism have a
special virtue: rather than contesting the claim that our concepts
are "socially constructed," these arguments suggest how the very
fact of "social construction" makes cultural relativism incoherent. But to explain this point adequately, one needs to say a bit
more about "social construction" and how it might preclude the
sort of relativism urged by multiculturalism. In what follows, I
will sketch a crude picture of how several philosophers think
about language. This picture necessarily distorts this philosophical thinking, the essence of which is that concepts cannot
be captured in formulae or pat summaries. But my hope is that
such distortion will point the way toward a cure for an even
cruder distortion prevalent in radical multicultural scholarship.
It has been a commonplace since at least the publication of
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations to note that the application of our concepts cannot be explained by formulae or
"assertibility conditions" contained in a single language user's
brain. Rather, the application of concepts depends on what
Wittgenstein called a "form of life" -meaning the practices,
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habits, interests, values, beliefs, attitudes, points of salience, etc.,
of a community of language users. In this sense, contrary to
Farber's and Sherry's assertion, one can say that all of our
terms-not only terms referring to social institutions, but also
logical rules, natural kinds like "water" and "gold," proper
names like "Mount Everest" -are "socially constructed": they
are intelligible only when one takes for granted a myriad of social practices and background assumptions. But, to avoid easy
platitudes about "language games," "forms of life," "meaning as
use," and so forth, all of which can so easily be a substitute for
thinking, it is useful to rehearse the arguments, familiar though
they might be. After I explain how language might depend on
our social practices, I will then suggest that this very dependence
precludes the sort of relativism that radical multiculturalists
want to defend.
Consider, first, why learning language might seem mysterious. One might think that this is a simple matter: one could
learn the definition of a word by seeing someone skilled at a
language point at a thing-say, Mount Everest-and utter some
sound from the language-say, "Mount Everest." This
"ostensive definition" -pointing-would inform one that the
sound referred to the thing. Having seen the word applied to
the thing, I can now properly apply "Mount Everest" to the
thing by making statements such as "Mount Everest has snow at
its peak."
But here is the mystery: how can I know that I am using the
name "Mount Everest" properly-that I am following the rule
for the word's use that was laid out by the definer when she
pointed her finger at Mount Everest? The answer is not selfevident. One has to interpret the pointing gesture to extract the
rule from it. Was the definer pointing at a particular mountain,
the entire Himalayan range, the planet earth? Or maybe some
combination of these items with the time of day, temperature,
season, and so forth? Or perhaps the gesture was intended to
denote something behind the speaker or above her: it is not selfevident that extending an index finger means that one wishes to
draw listeners' attention to items in the trajectory of the finger's
tip. One might try to examine all the cases in which the pointer
used the term "Mount Everest" and pointed her finger to see
what they all had in common. But, as W.V.O. Quine famously
explained, one could interpret every sentence in which "Mount
Everest" is uttered to refer to everything in the universe except
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Mount Everest and produce a logically consistent set of sentences.8
In short, it seems mysterious how one could acquire the
definition of a word from finger-pointing alone. One can reproduce the same mystery if one tries to explain how we use words
by arguing that we carry a definition of the word's proper uses in
our heads-a list of "truth conditions" or "assertibility conditions" that tell us when to utter the words. Under this view, one
might attempt to explain the mastery of a word like "Mount Everest" by a set of criteria that one carries with one in one's
memory-say, "the mountain climbed by Sir Edmund Hilary in
1953" or "the tallest mountain in the world." When one wishes
to use the word in a particular situation, one first consults the
list to see if the use is appropriate. This picture of language,
however, will fail for the same reason that the simple picture of
ostensive definition fails. The list of criteria, after all, would
seem to require interpretation just as much as the world of
which I wish to speak. If I need a list of criteria in order to
choose the right words with which to talk about the world, then
why do I not also need instructions in order to select the right
list of criteria? Then I face a dilemma: if I need such instructions, then there is an obvious prospect of an infinite regress.
On the other hand, if the list of criteria is self-explanatory, then
why cannot the world also be self-explanatory? The list is either
superfluous or inadequate.
And yet there is no use denying the obvious: we seem to
speak to each other. The point of the via negativa is not to establish solipsism but rather to show that "[i]nterpretations by
themselves do not determine meaning" because the interpretation "hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot
give it any support." 9 The meaning of words does not come
packaged in a neat list of assertibility conditions or paragraphs
from a dictionary or any other abstract formula. Then where
does it come from? Wittgenstein10 famously tells us that meaning
8. See W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Harvard U. Press, 1990).
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 198 (G.E.M. Anscombe,
trans., Macmillan Company, 3d ed. 1958).
10. There is a cottage industry of interpreting Wittgenstein's delphic writings. I am
neither qualified nor inclined to attempt any contribution to this industry's output: the
interpretation offered here is (or, at least, is intended to be) substantially identical to the
view of Wittgenstein's writings offered by Hilary Putnam and Jonathan Lear. See
Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question 27-56 (Blackwell, 1995); Hilary Putnam,
Words and Life 264-77 (James Conant ed., Harvard U. Press, 1995); Hilary Putnam, Review of The Concept of a Person, in 2 Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers
132-38 (Cambridge U. Press, 1975); Jonathan Lear, Transcendental Anthropology in
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is rooted in our "form of life" 11 -our whole culture, social practices, customs, desires, values, beliefs, interests, points of salience, institutions, etc. These interests- "the fixed point of real
need"- and not lists of assertibility conditions, truth conditions,
or any other relatively circumscribed set of linguistic artifacts
that breaths life into our words. Moreover, such interests need
not be present in our head when we use a word: it is enough that
they are evident in the acts and customs of language users. If we
are initiated into the proper use of the language by the community, then we can properly apply a concept even when we are
thinking about something else entirely. Thus, we "blindly" 12 apply our concepts or see the finger point at Mount Everest, because, given the social meaning of actions in the context of our
form of life, Mount Everest is the salient item and the direction
of the finger ought to go from wrist to finger-tip, and that's that.
No further reason can or need be given: we "have reached bedrock, and [our] spade is turned. " 13
How might this notion of a "form of life" preclude the relativism defended by radical multiculturalists? One might initially
think, to the contrary, that such a view of language as dependent
on values, interests, and concerns would actually make relativism even easier to accept. After all, one might argue that, because African-American scholars and white scholars have different values, concerns, and interests, they also have mutually
unintelligible languages with mutually untranslatable concepts
of truth, merit, and so forth. In other words, one might think
that different persons could have different forms of life, differences that would suggest "incommensurable" (meaning nontranslatable) conceptual schemes. This seems to be the notion
of relativism that radical multicultural scholars want to defend.
Why is not such a notion completely compatible with Wittgenstein's theory of language?
The problem with such multicultural logic is that the very
premise that one's language depends for its meaning on one's
form of life-one's usages, practice, concerns, and so forthindicates that no one can intelligibly refer to concepts outside
their "form of life." The reason is rooted in the theory of
Subject, Thought, and Context 267-98 (Philip Pettit and John McDowell eds., Clarendon
Press, 1986).
11. Wittgenstein at § 241 (cited in note 9).
12. Wittgenstein at§ 219 (cited in note 9) ("When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I
obey the rule blindly") (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at § 217.
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meaning outlined above. None of our concepts have any coherent application when separated from the social practices that
help constitute and breathe life into such concepts. It follows
that no one can sensibly use their concepts such as "language"
or "meaning" or "mind" to refer to some notion of language,
meaning, or mind outside of that form of life, for such concepts
would necessarily be empty sounds, terms devoid of real use in
the speaker's language. As Wittgenstein notes, "[t)he common
behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of
which we interpret an unknown language." 14 Therefore, if some
alleged word were to be used in ways that bore no relationship
to such "common behavior of mankind," we could not recognize
it as language. One cannot tear concepts like "language" and
"meaning" out of the context of familiar concerns and interests
that give them life by pretending that we have some abstract
idea of "language" that can be separated from the familiar uses
that we make of such words: "[i)f the mental item floats free of
the use we make of the expression, then it floats free of the
meaning as well. " 15
To see how the dependence of words on social practices
limits the possibility of using words to refer to practices that are
radically distinct from our own, consider an analogy between
language and the game of baseball. No one doubts that the rules
of baseball are "socially constructed" in the sense that their content is rooted in our society's interests, beliefs, practices, values,
etc. But it does not follow that the rules could be changed in
any way, no matter how drastic, and still remain intelligible as a
game. 16 For instance, one could probably not imagine the game
being altered so that the object was to avoid hitting the ball with
the bat. Any actions that could plausibly stand as evidence for
such a game (say, batters who never even appeared to care
about hitting the ball and pitchers who never apparently wished
to pitch a strike) would be even more plausible evidence that the
players simply were not playing any intelligible game at allthat they were simply goofing off in the sandlot without having
the object of winning the game by missing the ball. In other
words, because one could not attribute any of the "players"' actions to any familiar set of concerns and interests, one would not
14. ld. at§ 206.
15. Lear, Transcendental Anthropology at 274 (cited in note 10).
16. For an account of the different senses in which one might use the term "social
construction," see Sally Haslanger, Ontology and Social Construction, 23 Philosophical
Topics 95 (Fall 1995). Here, I use the term "social construction" in a sense roughly
similar to what Haslanger calls "strong pragmatic construction." Id. at 105-108.

1998]

TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES?

203

be justified in attributing to them the motive of playing a game
with the real purpose of missing the ball.
Applying these considerations to radical multiculturalist
claims, it becomes apparent that the dependence of our words
on our practices precludes the sort of conceptual relativism that
radical multiculturalists want to defend. Radical multiculturalists want to argue that one can intelligibly refer to concepts that
are coherent in one social group's language yet inaccessible to
another group. So, for instance, they argue that there can be a
concept of "merit" or "truth" that is intelligible to, say, AfricanAmericans but that is inaccessible to white, male scholars. But
the burden of Wittgenstein's work is to show that this talk of
radically incommensurable schemes-that is, untranslatable languages-is meaningless and incoherent. No white male scholar
is justified in talking about concepts of merit that can in principle play no role in his form of life, because white, male scholars
(like everyone else) can use words only to the extent that such
words are rooted in his everyday practices, assumptions, beliefs
about the world, and so forth. To talk of other concepts that are
inaccessible to oneself yet meaningful is to presume that one can
somehow travel outside one's form of life, viewing it as it were
from the exterior, and use words like "concept," "language,"
"merit," "truth," and so forth without reference to the myriad of
assumptions that make one's words meaningful. But this is an
illusion born of the notion that words gain their meaning from
abstract dictionary definitions that one carries around in one's
head rather than the unspoken and unspeakable social practices
that determine the proper use of words.
Therefore, when confronted with claims that other persons
have access to concepts of truth or merit or logic that are in
principle untranslatable into one's own language or inaccessible
to oneself, the properly humble assumption is to assume that the
claimant is speaking gibberish. The reason is simply that one
must honestly confess one's own limits. Such claims must necessarily be gibberish, because they can by hypothesis play no role
in one's own form of life and practices. The very premise of
"social construction" requires one to confess that one's own life
and practices are all that one has.
This view that talk of radically incommensurable schemes is
unintelligible is not simply an inference from the writings of
Wittgenstein. It is also the view of some of the most influential
philosophy of language in the United States today. Philosophers
like Donald Davidson and Hilary Putnam disagree on many im-
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portant points, 17 but they agree that the notion of radically incommensurable conceptual schemes is precluded by the dependence of our language on our form of life. For instance,
Davidson has made essentially this argument against the notion
of incommensurable conceptual schemes in his essay, On the
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. The central insight of
Davidson's essay is that, if a language is in principle untranslatable into our own language, then we would cease to be able to
recognize it as a language at all: "if all we know is what sentences a speaker holds true, and we cannot assume that his language is our own, then we cannot take even a first step towards
interpretation without knowing or assuming a great deal about
the speaker's beliefs. " 18 If we have evidence that the speakers'
beliefs depart from our own in fundamental ways, making it impossible for us to appreciate or translate those beliefs, then this
is even better evidence that the alleged speaker is no such thing
at all- that the alleged words really are idle sounds, akin to the
illusory "baseball" game. This is not because we imperiously
impose our notions of meaning on other cultures but because we
humbly cannot extend our own words "language," "meaning,"
and "truth" into areas where the familiar social practices and assumptions that make them meaningful do not apply.
One might protest that this view of language cannot be correct, for it seems to eliminate the possibility of principled and
intelligible disagreement among persons-an absurdity that
would, indeed, condemn the theory. But the theory has no such
consequence. Far from precluding disagreement, it makes such
disagreement possible. Disagreement, after all, is possible only
if speakers share a world about which they can disagree. As
Davidson points out, the possibility of meaningful disagreement
"depends entirely on a foundation-some foundation-in
agreement. .The agreement may take the form of widespread
sharing of sentences held true by speakers of 'the same language', or agreement in the large mediated by a theory of truth
17. See Putnam, Words and Life at 64-68 (cited in note 10) (explaining what Putnam regards as errors in Davidson's account of language); Donald Davidson, Belief and
the Basis of Meaning in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 141, 143 (Oarendon
Press, 1984) (taking issue with Wittgenstein's notion that linguistic meanings ought to be
explained on the basis of "non-linguistic intentions, uses, purposes, functions, and the
like" on the grounds that such an account of lapguage would eliminate "theorizing"
about language). For a discussion of how Wittgenstein's account does not preclude reflection about one's linguistic practices, see Lear, Transcendental Anthropology at 29398 (cited in note 10).
18. Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into
Truth and Interpretation 184, 196 (cited in note 17).
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contrived by an interpreter for speakers of another language."
But widespread agreement must exist for disagreement to be
possible.
So, for instance, suppose that I am watching a football game
with someone who exclaims, "Look at that player! He is offsides!" If it is obvious to me that the player is not off-sides, then
I have two choices available to me. I can assume that my companion understands the use of the term "off-sides" in football
and has simply made a mistake of fact. Or, if it seems that she
has as good a view of the field as myself, then I can assume that
she made no mistake of fact but simply does not understand the
terminology of football and misused the term "off-sides" to refer to some other, true fact about the player's observed actionsay, "clipping" or "holding" or some other violation of the conventional football rules. But one option is foreclosed to me: I
cannot say, "While everything in my normal practices, usage in
football, the context of your statement, and habits of observation indicate that this player is not 'off-sides' according to my
concept of 'off-sides,' it is possible that the player is properly described as being 'off-sides' according to some other notion of
'off-sides' that cannot be translated into any words used in my
language." For me to talk about concepts that are radically untranslatable in this sense is not merely to talk gibberish (for how
can I simultaneously admit that the word plays no role in my
language and yet use the word?) but also to make any meaningful disagreement with my companion impossible. I must simply
nod and say nothing.
Put another way, disagreement about matters of fact and
language has a place within our form of life, provided that the
disagreement is sufficiently narrow, occurring against a background of larger agreements. As one removes more of the aspects of common culture so that the discussion becomes more
remote from one's form of life, meaningful disagreement disappears, to be replaced by academic prattle without any real consequences for anyone's actions or beliefs. Many of the radical
multicultural statements quoted in Beyond All Reason have this
characteristic. They must be written off as meaningless rather
than incorrect. For instance, when Gary Peller denies that
"there is a difference between rational, objective representation
and interested, biased interpretation," (p. 28) (citation omitted)
the proper response is to hand him a reliable English dictionary.
19.

Id. at 196-97.
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If he insists in response that he is using the terms "rational,"
"objective," etc., in a sense different from the ordinary usage,
then we might ask him to provide an account of his usage in
terms of our "form of life" -that is, offer a thicker account of
his claim in conventional English. But if he insists that such
translation is impossible and refuses to give an intelligible account of the statement that is false in ordinary English, then
disagreement is at an end: we must view the statement as
meaningless gibberish because it is "useless" in Wittgenstein's
sense of the term, having no real consequences for our lives or
practices. It is a wheel spinning apart from the machine. 20

IV
Farber and Sherry are intuitively aware that such inflated
multicultural rhetoric precludes reasoned debate. This is their
complaint in chapter 4. But they ignore the voluminous philosophical literature that analyzes such claims of radical incommensurability, and they provide no careful account of what it
means for a sentence to be "socially constructed." Thus, they inexplicably contend that scientific statements about the natural
world are not socially constructed, while they seem to panic at
the thought that statements about social institutions might be
socially constructed-all the time ignoring the possibility that all
sentences might depend on our social practices and concerns for
their meaning and "social construction" in this sense might not
be so terrible after all. Instead of analyzing radical multiculturalist claims carefully in chapters 1 and 2, they solemnly treat
such claims as setting forth serious propositions and then engage
in a sort of intellectual blackmail, threatening us with horrible
consequences-anti-Semitism, a breakdown of polite debate,
factual inaccuracy, shrill accusations of racial treason and the
like-if we dare take such claims seriously.
But this argument about horrible consequences might be
exactly backwards. The problem with such abstract rhetoric is
not the radical consequences that follow, but rather the lack of
any meaningful consequences. Such abstractions have no serious role to play in policymaking of race relations. One could
20. Wittgenstein at § 271 (cited in note 9) ("Imagine a person whose memory
could not retain what the word 'pain' meant-so that he constantly called different
things by that name-but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual
symptoms and presuppositions of pain"- in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should
like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of
the mechanism") (emphasis in original).
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contrast such scholarship with empirical work that makes no
pretentious claims about meaning but which documents with
distressing detail the degree to which sexism and racism shape
American life. Consider, for instance, Nancy Burns' book on
the incorporation of suburban municipalities in the 1950s and
1960s, which uses sophisticated statistical inference to show that
incorporation decisions of suburban residents and developers
21
are best explained by racially exclusive purposes. Or consider
Ian Ayres' research suggesting that bail decisions and used car
sales are heavi}l influenced by the race or gender of the defendant or buyer. The sheer factual specificity of the data and sophistication of statistics in this work makes it far more disturbing-more "critical" -than the now-jejune extrapolations from
the writings of Derrida and Foucault that characterize the relativism of radical multicultural scholarship.
The American academic Left, in short, has had an unfortunate relationship with French social theory, a relationship that
has drawn it into sterile ground with the false promise of radical
critique. One suspects that the attraction of such theory owes a
lot to the intellectual's traditional romance with Paris as the historical home of the heroic intellectual-revolutionary-the city of
Robespierre, Lamartine orating from the balcony in 1848, the
June Days, expatriate revolutionaries on the Left Bank, Sartre
in the cafe, and students on the barricades in '68. Is it any wonder that law professors would be attracted by these heady connotations of romantic radicalism suggested by French social theory, ignoring the comparatively stodgy atmosphere of British
and American philosophy departments and the dense arguments
of Donald Davidson, Saul Kripke, Putnam, Tyler Burge, and
other philosophers of language who spend their time analyzing
apparently dry matters like Convention-T, the scope of the concept of "arthritis," and the reference of demonstratives?
Beyond All Reason does little to provide a serious intellectual challenge to French social theory's more bizarre claims.
The book is a useful, well-written description of an unpromising
trend in the legal academy, but it provides only the weakest of
antidotes to cure these maladies. By choosing to rest their arguments exclusively on the dangerous consequence of radical
21. Nancy Bums, The Formation of American Local Governments: Private Values
in Public Institutions (Oxford U. Press, 1994).
22. Ian Ayres and Joel Woldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail
Setting, 46 Stan L. Rev. 987 (1994); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimi·
nation in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 8F (1991).
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multiculturalism, Farber and Sherry have missed an opportunity
to provoke a much-needed debate on the claims of linguistic
relativism.

